Deterring CBRN Terrorism:

Developing a Conceptual Framework

Project Summary

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Over the past five years, a great deal of resources - financial, intellectual, time ñ have been expended in preparing for and developing a national capacity to respond to incidents of CBRN terrorism.Ý These efforts have included substantial federal government programs designed to bolster the ability of state and local public safety and public health agencies and departments to prevent, detect, and respond to this form of terrorism.Ý Both executive and legislative branch officials have stated these programs are designed not just to detect, thwart, and mitigate the effects of CBRN terrorism, but are also designed to deter potential terrorists from using these types of weapons.Ý But does it make sense for government officials to talk about deterring CBRN terrorists as part of a national counterterrorism strategy?Ý What does it mean to deter potential terrorists? What about potential CBRN terrorists?Ý Should the government actively use a strategy of deterrence when addressing the terrorism problem or the threat of mass casualty terrorism?Ý What are the available instruments useful in implementing a deterrence strategy with the broader national counterterrorism strategy?Ý How could these various instruments deter potential terrorists? This paper provides a conceptual foundation for deterring potential CBRN terrorists that could be used to develop an overall integrative strategy for deterring CBRN terrorism.Ý While the success of a deterrence-based strategy ultimately depends on the nature and motivation of the individual terrorist or terrorist group, casting what Graham Pearson describes as the ìweb of deterrenceî toward potential terrorist has the potential to catch a large portion of them.Ý Importantly, this study does not argue for developing a new set of instruments of deterrence, many of the instruments currently being developed and bolstered can be integrated and exploited within a deterrence-based strategic framework.

Developing this framework requires elucidating and then integrating the component parts of three distinct, but closely related dimensions.Ý The first dimension, the elements of deterrence, is the basic conceptual precepts of deterrence theory.Ý The second dimension, opportunities for deterrence, are those decision points within the process of CBRN terrorism, from group formation to developing a CBRN weapon to its actual utilization, that could be affected by attempts at deterrence.Ý The final dimension, the instruments of deterrence, is the set of tools that are used to implement a deterrence strategy to affect those decision points.Ý Identifying the range of constituent parts of each produces a matrix that was used to explore the interaction between opportunities, instruments, and conceptual elements.Ý This matrix is shown in figure 1.Ý By systematically working through the linkages and relationships between the components of each dimension of this matrix, the foundation for a strategy of deterrence within the overarching counter CBRN terrorism effort was developed.Ý Each dimension and its component parts are discussed below.

Elements of Deterrence

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ While the exact details of how a terrorist group develops an interest, formally decides to use, and then goes about the task of developing CBRN weapon will differ between different groups, the concept and practice of deterrence has not changed much since the conceptual development and refinement conducted during the early period of the nuclear standoff.Ý Most of the components of the deterrence concept have remained constant, but they have been utilized in new situations to address changes in current threats and new types of threats.Ý While following elements are listed in no particular order, it is important to note each element must be present within an effective deterrence strategy.Ý Each conceptual element forms an indispensable part of the concept and practice of deterrence.Ý

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Action to be deterred ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ In the case of CBRN terrorism, the ultimate objective is to prevent the use of a CBRN weapon by a terrorist.Ý Yet, as the CBRN process model demonstrates, a number of steps and intermediate actions have to occur before the terrorist can use such a weapon. Examples of these steps include acquisition of resources necessary to obtain equipment, materials, and expertise, as well as operational preparations for employing the weapon of choice, testing and evaluation, etc.Ý Each of these intermediate steps provides an action an actor can be deterred from taking.Ý If the terrorist can be deterred from undertaking any of these steps, the effect will cascade down to prevent the terrorist from developing or using a CBRN weapon.Ý Thus, the objective of a deterrence strategy in the context of CBRN terrorism should not only be deterring use of the weapon, but should also focus on attempting to deter the terrorist from undertaking any of the intermediate steps between contemplating use and the actual utilization.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Target of deterrenceÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ any deterrence situation involves deterring the target of deterrence from undertaking the action to be deterred.Ý Because deterrence involves affecting the decision making process of individuals who can undertake the action being deterred before that action is taken, that individual or set of individuals are the primary the targets of deterrence.Ý For a lone actor, he or she becomes the sole target.Ý For a terrorist group, the individuals comprising the group provide the possible targets.Ý Deterring a state often focuses on the leadership as the target of deterrence.Ý For many (especially modern) terrorist groups, a formal leadership structure may be hard to define.Ý Even within highly structured groups, decision making does not rest solely with the formal individual leader or leadership structure within the group - although they are important to examine. Because the various steps in the CBRN terrorism process should provide a range of opportunities for deterrence, a broad range of actors are potential targets of deterrence.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Deterrence requires the target of deterrence not only be recognized and identified, but also understood.Ý Knowing the CBRN terroristís motivations and what it values will help determine how costs and benefits can be manipulated for the purpose of deterrence.Ý Thoroughly understanding the groupís motivations and values provides the baseline for assessments of the governmentís ability to manipulate costs, benefits, and risks involved with development and use of a CBRN weapon.ÝÝ

Since the practice of deterrence rests on affecting decisions made by the target, deterrence also requires an understanding of how the target, in this case the CBRN terrorist, makes decisions.Ý While most models of deterrence suggest decision making based on a mechanistic cost/benefit analysis, in reality, decision making is a highly complex and psychological process. ÝMost decisions to act are based on process combining a purely rational model that weighs expected costs with benefits with a model that accounts for degrees of risk associated with taking a certain action.Ý Decision making can also include numerous, non-rational, psychological factors, including hatred of certain segments of the population -- the government, or Americans in general -- fear, various clinical ailments, etc.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Cost/Benefit ManipulationÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Most theories of deterrence focus on the need to manipulate the costs and benefits incurred by the target after undertaking the action being deterred.Ý By reducing the benefits gained by acting or increasing the cost of acting, the target will be less likely to undertake the action being deterred.Ý In order for the capability to manipulate costs and benefits affect the targetís decision to act, the target must recognize the deterrerís capability and willingness to manipulate costs and benefits before a decision is made.Ý In doing so, the target of deterrence, in this case the terrorist, may be influenced to refrain from undertaking the intermediate steps in the CBRN terrorism process model. The key to deterrence is shaping the actorís perception of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with acting before he acts.

Cost can be measured in terms of punishment, financial resources, time, capability acquired, diminished international standing, internal political perceptions, etc.Ý In this regard, perhaps the strongest cost that can be fostered through deterrence is a personal impact on the freedom of the terrorist, including imprisonment.Ý Increasing costs is intended to create a perception in the mind of the terrorist that the risks associated with the undesired action are above acceptable levels.Ý

Equally important is creating the perception that the action will not produce the desired impact.Ý This could be done by demonstrating that the action will be successful by demonstrating use of a CBRN weapon will not produce the intended effect - instilling fear, producing a negotiating situation, or mass casualties.Ý Deterring CBRN terrorism requires convincing the potential CBRN terrorist that the benefits to be derived from acting are minimal or nonexistent and that the costs incurred will be high.

CommunicationÝÝ Communication with the target plays a pivotal role in any attempt to deter an actor from taking a certain action.Ý Indeed, it may be the single most important element of deterrence because the key is to influence the actor before he or she acts.Ý This is done through convincing them that there will be a response to their action and of that such a response will impose costs, remove benefits, or increase risks.Ý Effective communication is the mechanism through which the deterrer can provide the actor with this information.

If the target is known, communication can be either direct or indirect.Ý Direct communication can take various forms - phone calls, written messages, etc.Ý Indirect communication take the shape of broad public statement geared toward the target, information and demonstrations of capability and commitment, and previous actions taken by the deterrer in a similar situation.Ý Indirect communication is usually used in situations in which the specific target of deterrence is not known or there are no means of direct communication.Ý It is also used when the source of communication needs to be obfuscated from the target.Ý Indirect communication assumes the target will listen to information and messages provided to the general public.Ý Thus, information can be disseminated to the general public but designed for receipt by a particular actor or a certain type of actor that is a subset of the broader public.

CredibilityÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Deterrence involves a large degree of psychological interplay between the target and the deterrer.Ý In large part, it revolves around shaping the perception of the target.Ý If the target group does not believe one is capable of manipulating the costs and benefits in the course of responding to the action being deterred, the target will not incorporate the deterrer-provided information in their decision-making process.Ý In other words, if the target does not believe the deterrer is either willing or able to respond as promised, information on what that response will be and how it will affect the actor will not influence the actor.

Credibility is an important, but challenging, conceptual element when attempting to implement a deterrence strategy in any context.Ý It could be difficult for the deterring party to portray credibility in their communication with the target.Ý The mode of communication may not be amenable to reinforcing credibility.Ý Additionally, the target may not be willing to take any communication from the deterring party (especially when it is the United States government) as credible.Ý For example, information purporting a high-level of readiness in Washington or New York City can be perceived by certain actors to be part of a government ìmisinformationî campaign, and thus is not the truth.

Opportunities for Deterrence

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Where might deterrence be successful?Ý At what points could the instruments of deterrence successfully deter?Ý Terrorism is not a simple phenomenon.Ý It should not be defined as the moment where explosives in the trunk of an automobile detonate or where salmonella bacteria sprayed on a salad bar begins to sicken restaurant patrons.Ý Terrorism is best described a series of interrelated activities that progress over time from ideology formation to the use of violence to support of the objectives of that ideology.Ý Importantly, terrorism involves more than a single decision to acquire and utilize an instrument of violence - conventional explosive, nuclear explosive, biological agent release, or chemical agent release.Ý Successfully engaging in terrorist activities involves a series of decisions undertaken by a series of individuals (assuming the terrorist is not a lone actor) over a period of time.Ý This fact is important to consider because the application of deterrence theory involves affecting those decisions.Ý In examining CBRN terrorism in particular, the following list of activities provides the basic model used during the project analysis.Ý Each of the following steps is listed not in the order in which they occur, but the order of logical progression.Ý In other words, for each step in the process model, the steps listed above that step must have previously occurred.Ý Thus, each step can continue during the rest of the terrorism process.

… Value Formation - Creation of group, individual, or individual affinity for group

… Motivation - Recognition of link between CBRN weapon effects and objectives, as well as force that drives the actor to CBRN activity

… Planning & Information Gathering - Determining what weapon, methods of acquisition and development, and potential targets

… Acquisition - Process of obtaining materials and equipment needed for weapon fabrication

… Stockpiling - Fabrication of CBRN weapons

… Deployment - Preparing weapons for use (testing, evaluation, prepositioning)

… Dispersal - Actual use of the weapon

Exploitation - Phenomenon resulting from useÝ (mass casualties, fear & panic, political bargaining)

Instruments of Deterrence

While the basic elements of deterrence have not changed since the early days of the American-Soviet nuclear confrontation, the ways in which the theory has been applied has changed over time.Ý Even within the context of the Cold War nuclear confrontation, both the instruments and the ways in which both parties exploited the instruments in order to deter the other did change.Ý In the context of dealing with potential CBRN terrorists, a different set of instruments is available for deterrence.Ý Each of the following instruments could be used to exploit the opportunities for deterrence provided by the process of CBRN terrorism.Ý While each instrument is presented separate from the others, it is also important to keep in mind the synergistic deterrent effect of the set of instruments working together within a deterrence strategy.

AwarenessÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Awareness refers to the deterrerís ability to identify and assess both the target(s) of deterrence and the available opportunities.Ý Apart from identifying and assessing targets and opportunities, it also supports the other instruments of deterrence discussed later in this paper.Ý Awareness involves utilizing a number of tools including traditional intelligence functions, law enforcement, open source information, and increasingly, information provided by non-governmental organization involved with monitoring disaffected segments of society.

The process of identifying and assessing potential CBRN terrorists and opportunities of deterrence can be broken into two levels.Ý On a strategic level, awareness should identify the set of possible targets and provide key information on those targets, including a degree of understanding of their motivations and value systems.ÝÝ Answers to the following types of questions can identify where costs and benefits can be manipulated and which instruments will need to be used: What does the target hold valuable?Ý How can it be taken away?Ý What are their motivations for using a CBRN weapon? Can they be changed?Ý Does the target have very sensitive points of leverage that can be manipulated - perhaps a fear of being discovered or a lack of financial resources?Ý And, how can they be exploited?Ý Human intelligence, from different sources including law enforcement and non-governmental organization, and various types of signals intelligence will be most useful at this level.Ý Exploiting open source information will also play an important role in recognizing groups, their membership, propaganda, etc.

On a tactical level, awareness facilitates many of the other instruments used to manipulate the costs, benefits, and risk incurred by the CBRN terrorist. What are the possible threat agents?Ý What are the targets of attack for a particular group? How is a suspected CBRN terrorism obtaining they obtaining materials and equipment? What are their targets? Can we detect small-scale use and tests, etc.?Ý Answers to many of these questions require effective technical intelligence sources.Ý For others, answers can only be derived through a level of self-awareness.Ý Assuming the terrorist will move down the path of least resistance, answering many of these questions require continual surveys of internal vulnerabilities and levels of capabilities.

Awareness also directly provides direct means of increasing costs incurred by many CBRN terrorists.Ý Recognizing the possibility or existence of an intelligence operation targeted at their activities, they may find it necessary to take security measures to thwart those operations, which could increase cost or disrupt their activities.Ý It may also complicate observation of group activities by intelligence.Ý They may also decide to skip certain activities because of the greater risk of discovery.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ A fundamental consideration at both the strategic and tactical levels is the integration, synthesis, and analysis of data from the multitude of sources.Ý It is one thing to exploit various information sources to collect and then store information and data.Ý It is another thing to use that data to understand the situation and provide both explanations and forecasts.Ý Intelligent, disciplined, alert analysts are the cornerstones of good analysis.Ý A number of technical solutions can assist in integration and initial analysis.

Denial Measures Denial measures are designed to retard or completely prevent the acquisition of CBRN weapons, materials, and equipment by the terrorist.Ý They range from pre-incident preventive to incident or crisis management measures.Ý Many of these measures are economically oriented and serve to increase the cost of acquisition incurred by the terrorist.Ý Costs can be measured in financial terms, but also include difficulty or ease of acquisition, time, anonymity, personnel, and other metrics.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Denial measures are designed to increase the cost and decrease the chance of success involved with acquiring or developing a CBRN weapon.Ý They work to prevent or complicate acquisition or development.Ý Early recognition of the involved difficulty should influence the decision to undertake subsequent activities before they are undertaken.Ý A key question is whether the terrorist can be convinced not to attempt acquisition by informing him or her that it is too hard and the chance of success is low.Ý If our ability to control transfers of technologies to non-state groups is perceived by the terrorist to be ineffective, they are not likely to be deterred from attempting to acquire the requisite weapons, materials, and equipment.Ý The key is shaping the terrorist's perception of the level of difficulty before acquisition is attempted.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Convincing the potential terrorist that CBRN acquisition and deployment is too difficult requires actually increasing the level of difficulty.Ý Many of the mechanisms and systems for controlling technology transfers to state actors are already in place at both the national and international levels.Ý While they have been developed and refined over time to stem proliferation by states, many regimes have dealt with front companies or illegitimate non-governmental scientific exchange organizations created by states to engage in illicit technology transfers.Ý These regimes already attempt to address non-state actors, but they still need improvement to address the problem posed by non-state actors not linked with state programs.Ý With quickening pace of globalization, domestic legislation designed to control the spread of critical materials and equipment, like the CDC's Select Agent List, needs to be implemented on an international basis to be successful.Ý

Defensive MeasuresÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Robust defenses reduce or completely remove the motivation to use CBRN weapons by preventing mass casualties, calming public fears and instilling confidence after an attack thus reducing the panic and psychological impact the terrorist may be seeking, and reducing the terrorist's leverage with the government or other organization. Reducing the terrorist's ability to achieve any of these objectives by using a CBRN weapon contributes to deterring both their acquisition and use - perhaps focusing their attention on conventional systems.

Within the cluster of CBRN weapons, chemical and biological weapons are the two classes of weapons most amenable to defenses.Ý Both chemical and biological weapons are non-explosive systems whose impact on the subject of attack is not the product of energy released in such an explosion.Ý Rather, the fact that chemical and biological weapons work through the systems of the human body creates opportunities for successful intervention.Ý Donning protective equipment prior to an attack, for example, will prevent both the physical and psychological impact the attacker is trying to achieve.Ý Similarly, the time between release of an agent and its effect provides an opportunity to successfully intervene and mitigate the physical effects. Techniques to rapidly identify the agents, antibiotics, medical facilities, decontamination equipment, well trained medical personnel, shelters, filtered air, and evacuation procedures are just some of the measures to provide for defense against a chemical or biological (and perhaps radiological) attack.Ý Demonstrating an effective response to the physical effects of a chemical or biological weapon will go a long way in reducing the psychological effects.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ The key to integrating defenses into a deterrence strategy is to make sure the target recognizes adequate defenses are in place.Ý By clarifying to the terrorist that the nation's vulnerability to CBW attack is very low, they should conclude that their chance of success is low. With respect to defenses, the most important, but the most challenging question is ìhow much is enough?îÝ The U.S. government is spending considerable financial resources and making enormous investments of other resources such as time, manpower, and strategic planning to answer that question.Ý But the answer is not straightforward.Ý One part of the answer, for example, depends on how much risk the country is willing to live with and how much risk reduction the country can afford, given competing priorities.ÝÝ

Punitive MeasuresÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ The objective of punitive measures is not to affect their ability to obtain a CBRN weapon or effectively use it, but to impose high costs in response to attempts to acquire or use such weapons.Ý Integrating punitive measures into a deterrence strategy equates to ìdeterrence through assured punishment.îÝ

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Punitive measures could have a drastic impact on decisions to act, especially if the survival of the group is placed at stake. Military force could be used to influence decisions by threatening group destruction by killing all or most of its members.Ý Even without eliminating all or most members of a terrorist organization, the possibility of swift retaliation and the fear of death may deter individual members from carry through with the group's plans.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ Effective law enforcement and prosecution can play an especially important role in shaping the punitive dimension of deterrence.Ý Some individual actors, however, may not be affected by the possibility of arrest and prosecution - except insofar as it affects their ability to accomplish their CBRN terrorism objectives.Ý These actors may not care about what happens after the weapon is used.Ý Thus, it may be more effective for law enforcement to focus on investigating and prosecuting those involved with intermediate steps in the process.Ý With respect to the all the possible means of punishment, law enforcement, prosecution, military force, etc., past actions seem to be important for shaping the terrorist's perception of the likely response.Ý As was mentioned previously, deterrence rests on the target's perception of the benefits and costs of acting before making the decision to act.Ý Historical precedent does represent one piece of information the terrorist will use to make a judgment on acting or not acting, and the likely response to acting.Ý Low or no fines or jail times or no military response to past terrorism incidents will not make a positive contribution in deterring the potential terrorists in the present.

CommunicationÝÝ As has been mentioned throughout this paper, the key to deterrence is having the likely or probable response to the action being deterred affect the target's decision to undertake that action.Ý This means the target, in this case the potential CBRN terrorist, must be informed of the likely response before a decision is made to act.Ý Communication is the process by which this information is passed from the deterrer to the target. Communication should be used to provide the potential CBRN terrorist with very specific pieces of information. The overarching objective is to inform the terrorist about the nature of the response that will take place for each step in the CBRN terrorism process. It should explicitly link the action being deterred with the probability of a specific response.Ý It should also inform the terrorist on how the nature of that response will increase costs, decrease benefits, and/or decrease the chance of success. It should also attempt to inform the terrorist of both the ability and the willingness of the deterrer to respond as promised in a way that the terrorist finds convincing and believable.

If a specific target is known and willing to listen or unable to shut out the deterrerís message, direct communication is possible and packages of information tailored to the specific actor can be developed.Ý Because most actors will probably attempt to remain anonymous before attempting to carry out acts of violence, this type of direct communication is most likely to occur during crisis management situations.Ý

If a specific target of deterrence is not known, communication with potential CBRN terrorists is still possible. Because the terrorist resides within the general public, information provided to the general public can be exploited as a means of providing the potential terrorist with information.Ý Some examples of this type of communication include broadly disseminated general statements (perhaps on the level of preparedness and defensive capabilities, the difficulty of acquiring or developing a CBRN weapon given the capability of various denial measures, the high cost that will be incurred by the group and the individual members of the groupís attempting or actually using a CBRN weapon) that filter through to the terrorist, use of third parties to provide information - either direct communication or general statements and declarations, intentionally providing a carefully calibrated level transparency regarding high levels of current capabilities, preparedness, and vulnerabilities, open demonstrations of capabilities, and others.Ý Transparency should make available a certain type and amount of information in order to inform potential terrorists about capabilities and preparedness, but not jeopardize those capabilities in the process.

Use of the media is one tool in such a strategy.Ý This includes the print media, television, and the Internet.Ý These types of tools tend to actively acquire information, synthesize and summarize it, and then broadcast it to the general public.Ý Information can be provided to various media outlets for the purpose of shaping both the information the media has and the way in which that information is synthesized and broadcast.Ý The controlled release of information to the public is another tool.ÝÝ In this case, information is made directly available to the public from the government.Ý This information is usually not filtered by the media and requires the public to take a more active role in attempting to obtain it.Ý ÝExamples include statements by public officials have focused on exposing the public to the threat in order to mobilize an effective response, official written reports and policy statements, conversations with government officials, etc.Ý Through these attempts, we may have been inadvertently communicating to the terrorist that developing and using certain types of CBRN weapons is easy or that we are highly vulnerable to such weapons (e.g., ìIf it was difficult, it would not be such a large problem.î).Ý We will need to use similar statements to inform both the public and the terrorists when our vulnerabilities are effectively reduced or eliminated.

One part of an overall communication strategy for deterrence may be analyzing the information requirements of the archetype CBRN terrorist.Ý Planning a CBRN terrorism incident will require information on the level of vulnerability of a particular target, the type of security surrounding a target, or the type of defenses, for example the amount and types of vaccines included in the national pharmaceutical stockpiles.Ý Determining these requirements may provide the opportunities to communicate with potential terrorists who have not been specifically identified by providing a mechanism by which information can be provided to the terrorist.

International Cooperation Many of the previously mentioned instruments have an international dimension.Ý For many of these, the international dimension may require extension or enhancement to be completely effective.Ý For example, international conventions could criminalize state-sponsored terrorism and CBRN use and institutionalize extradition and prosecution of such perpetrators.Ý Specific guidelines for sharing intelligence information could improve the capability to track and assess transnational terrorist groups.ÝÝ

Globalization and transnational supply networks for illicit materials make international, multilateral mechanisms a cornerstone of effective technology transfer controls.Ý As technologies, particularly dual-use technologies related to chemical and biological weapons, become increasingly diffuse, these measures may have to expand or change their focus and structure.Ý One specific continuing need is increased transparency.Ý While states will not be able to eliminate transfers of technology, some structure or mechanism to increase the transparency of transfers when they happen could contribute to deterrence.Ý Such transparency could be helpful for companies to better control their own activities and promote awareness of individuals and organizations engaged in trafficking in CBRN related materials and equipment.ÝÝ Multilateral agreements like the CWC, BWC, and NPT help to de-emphasize or even de-legitimize these weapons.Ý Additionally, these agreements promote a taboo against the use of CBRN weapons by any actor.

International cooperation does have a unique set of questions and challenges.Ý The sharing of information and intelligence between countries continues to pose a challenge.ÝÝ Perennial questions like what types of intelligence can be shared and how intelligence should be shared continue to be asked.Ý The answer will depend on the nature of the relationship between the Unites States and the particular potential partner.Ý It also involves a period of time to recognize the value of sharing information and the establishment of guidelines for intelligence sharing with specific countries.

Coordinating and sustaining both attention and effort will be difficult across international coalitions.Ý One specific difficulty will be working with international partners while maintaining a unified message.Ý Differences of opinion have developed within the United States over such issues as the precise nature of the CBRN terrorism threat, and the required response to that threat.Ý Such disagreements certainly span international boundaries.

Another difficulty lies the area of burden sharing.Ý International cooperation could include cooperative development of technologies designed to improve denial or defense capabilities of both the United States and its allies and international partners.Ý Improving our partnersí capabilities will allow them to operate as an effective ally in our counterterrorism efforts.Ý Who should provide funding for international research and development efforts?Ý What are respective responsibilities for each member in the international effort?Ý Is there some specialization of capabilities on a country-by-country basis or should the objective be a fairly regular uniform capability across the coalition?

Conclusions

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ This briefing has attempted to develop and elaborate a conceptual framework for deterring CBRN terrorism.Ý Given the various pathways and conceptual connections we have summarized in this paper, there are some general conclusions that can be drawn.

ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ This projectís most basic conclusion is that it is possible to deter the CBRN terrorist, but it is not going to work in all situations for all actors.Ý As has been argued, many of the instruments of deterrence are already in place or being put into place; the challenge lies in using them for deterrence in an integrated and synergistic way.Ý If deterrence fails, these instruments should provide some measure of protection by themselves.Ý Advanced awareness of potential targets and how agents interact with them, or knowledge of clinical and epidemiological patterns of particular diseases will aid in rapid detection and mitigation.Ý An informed public will be less likely to panic during a CBRN event and will better understand how they can aid or ease the strain of managing a crisis.Ý Effective denial measures may deter some actors from attempting to acquire CBRN-related equipment and materials or drive them down a less dangerous or less sophisticated pathway by complicating their acquisition methods.Ý Similarly, if effective defensive measures fail to deter, they will mitigate the effects of agent release or weapon detonation.Ý International cooperation could bring new greater resources to bare in developing technologies -- detection, vaccines, etc.-- that may reduce the casualties of an attack.Ý Finally, long-term prevention, like communication, will help create awareness in the general public.

It is also important to recognize the relationship between various instruments of deterrence, especially the instruments that impact cost/benefit/risk manipulation.Ý Perhaps the most important of these is the relationship between denial and defense measures.Ý Successful denial measures should work to decrease the scope of the problem left to defensive measures to mitigate.Ý In other words, better denial measures will reduce the burden on defenses.Ý Together, denial and defensive measures should be used to convey to potential terrorists that it is ìtoo hardî and attempts will not be successful.

Awareness and communication integrate the denial, defense, and punitive measures into a conceptual framework for deterrence.Ý Awareness will identify and provide understanding of potential CBRN terrorists.Ý Awareness also supports the effective application of the denial, defense, and punitive measures. Both long-term prevention and international cooperation support all of the other instruments of deterrence.Ý Communication is a cornerstone.Ý By developing some means of communication, the potential CBRN terrorist can be informed of the likely response to acts of terrorism involving CBRN weapons and what the result of such incidents will be.Ý This information needs to be communicated to the potential terrorist before the act is undertaken.ÝÝ A successful denial strategy will narrow the threat envelope, thus reducing the requirement for defensive measures.

To further stress the point, many of the instruments of deterrence currently exist and are being improved, but they need to be integrated in the context of a policy framework aimed toward deterrence of potential CBRN terrorists. In the end, communication plays a vital integrative role in a deterrence strategy by linking the various methods of response to future incidents of CBRN terrorism ñ preventative, defensive, and punitive ñ in the mind of potential terrorists and thus attempts to influence decisions to undertake CBRN terrorism being made in the present.